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I. INTRODUCTION
The principle of conscientious objection to military service has
received limited recognition in international law and human rights
documents,' although it is an issue that has been discussed and
studied by the United Nations2 and various religious organizations'
for a considerable period of time. The United Nations Commission
on Human Rights has refrained from declaring that conscientious
objection should be considered a fundamental human right, despite
the extensive consideration this issue has received. Consequently,
the status of a conscientious objector depends upon the benevolence
of one's nation and any constitutional, legislative or administrative
provisions that may exist entitling an individual to exemption from
military service.
In the United States, the exemption of conscientious objectors
from military service is a privilege granted by act of Congress.'
There exists no constitutional provision, express of implied, which
confers a right of conscientious objection to military service.' Relief
from the obligation to serve in the armed forces has been a con-
cern to objecting United States citizens6 as long as any form of
See Schaffer & Weissbrodt, Conscientious Objection to Military Service as a Human Right,
9 REV. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 33, 37-40 (1972).
' The question of conscientious objection to military service was raised in the United
Nations as early as 1950, and as recently as March, 1982. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4NGO/1
Add. 1 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Statement by Service Civil International]; 1982 U.N.
ESCOR Supp. (No. 2) at 76, 154-55, U.N. Doc. E/1982/12; E/CN.4/1982130 (1982).
' See Schaffer & Weissbrodt, supra note 1, at 35-37.
4 50 U.S.C. app. §456(j) (1976), which provides "Nothing contained in this title [sections
451 to 471a of this appendix] shall be construed to require any person to be subject to
combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason
of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."
5 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623-24 (1930), rev'd on other grounds, Girouard
v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). This statement is not affected by the subsequent deci-
sion in Girouard. See also Brief for Petitioner at 61-68, Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437 (1971). According to that brief, James Madison initially proposed a clause that "no
person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military ser-
vice in person," be included in the Bill of Rights. That clause and subsequent proposals
similar to it were not incorporated in the amendments to the U.S. Constitution because
the states already protected that right and no need seemed to exist for blanket federal
protection. Id. at 62, 64, 68.
6 Under the present Selective Service Act, every male citizen of the U.S. and every
other male resident between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, is required to register
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conscription has existed.' A study undertaken by the United Na-
tions Division of Human Rights for the Sub-Commission on Preven-
tion of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,8 and the re-
cent revision of the United States Selective Service regulations
with respect to the adjudication of claims for the deferment or
exemption from military service,9 have revived this question of
conscientious objection.
This Note initially reviews the consideration by the United Na-
tions of the question of conscientious objection. The Note then will
examine the concept and various dimensions of conscientious ob-
jection to military service in the United States, and delineate both
the recognized valid grounds for conscientious objection, and the
procedures for obtaining the status of conscientious objector. The
question of alternative service in lieu of induction is evaluated,
as is the status of an individual who objects to military or alter-
native service in a manner not permitted by law. Asylum for per-
sons who flee their country because their objection to-military ser-
vice is not recognized is considered as well. An attempt is made
to provide some guidance in establishing international standards
for conscientious objection, by comparing the provisions relating
to conscientious objection in West Germany, Yugoslavia, and Brazil.
Finally, this Note evaluates the probability and operative effect
of a declaration by the United Nations that conscientious objec-
tion be considered a fundamental human right.
with the Selective Service System. 50 U.S.C. app. S 453 (1976). Section 453 provides an
exception to registration for aliens with lawful nonimmigrant status under section 101(a)(15)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (66 Stat. 163; 8 U.S.C. S 1101 (1976
& Supp. III 1979)). Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States
(Immigration and Nationality Act S 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. S 1101 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)), are
required to register. 50 U.S.C. app. S 456(a)(1) (1976).
For a documentary history of conscientious objection in the United States from 1757
to 1967, see CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA (L. Schlissel ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as CONSCIENCE
IN AMERICA]. See also Greenawalt, All or Nothing at All: The Defeat of Selective Conscientious
Objection, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 31,35-47, for a concise historical summary of the law in the United
States prior to Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
, Letter from Theo C. van Boven to J. F. Green, Executive Director of the Commission
to Study the Organization of Peace, forwarded to Louis B. Sohn, Chairman of the Commission
(Dec. 4, 1981). This letter requested information examining the question of conscientious
objection to military service and its inter-relationship with the promotion and protection
of human rights. This information is to be used to make an analysis for the Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, as directed in Resolution
14 (XXXIV), Question of Conscientious Objection to Military Service, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1512;
E/CN.4/Sub. 2/495 at 87-88 (1981), adopted on September 10, 1981 by that Sub-Commission
(letter and resolution available in Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law
Offices).
' Deferment or Exemption From Military Service, 47 Fed. Reg. 4,640 (1982) (to be codified
in scattered sections of 32 C.F.R.).
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II. UNITED NATIONS CONSIDERATION
In 1950, the Secretary-General of the United Nations circulated
a statement prepared by the Service Civil International, which
documented the legislative and administrative provisions of thirty-
four countries regarding conscientious objection.10 However, not
until 1956 did the United Nations itself study the problem of con-
scientious objection to military service," and then the issue was
considered only within the context of a Study of Discrimination
in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices'2 (hereinafter 1960
Study). In connection with the 1960 Study, monographs of twenty-
four countries were prepared, which included information on con-
scientious objection to military service.'" The Study concluded that
while there was no uniform solution to the problem of conscien-
tious objection, exemptions should be granted to sincere objectors
in a manner that would protect the objector from public disdain
for the exercise of religious convictions." The issue of the recogni-
tion of conscientious objection to military service as a human right
arose again in 1971 within the context of the Commission on Human
Rights' agenda item "Study of the Question of the Education of
Young all over the World for the Development of its Personality
and Strengthening of its Respect for the Rights of Man-and Fun-
damental Freedoms."' 5 This subject was viewed as an appropriate
"D Statement by Service Civil International, supra note 2. This statement distinguished
between: (1) 12 countries with compulsory military service and with legal provisions for
conscientious objectors (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Israel,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United States of America); (2)
18 countries with compulsory military service but without legal provision for conscientious
objectors (Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, France, Greece, Italy, Mexico,
Persia, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, Turkey, Union of South Africa,
and Venezuela); and (3) 4 countries without compulsory military service (Costa Rica, India,
Lebanon, and Syria).
"I The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
adopted Resolution C, in which the Sub-Commission decided to study discrimination in the
matter of religious rights and practices. Mr. Arcot Krishnaswami was appointed as the
Special Rapporteur of the study. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4f721; E/CN.4/Sub. 2/177 at 44-45 (1956).
"D U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/200 Rev. 1; U.N. Sales No. 60.XIV.2 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as 1960 Study]. The 1960 Study devoted only two pages of text to the discussion of cons-
cientious objection. Id. at 43-44.
"3 1960 Study Monographs, reprinted in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1118 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as 1972 Report]. Those countries included: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Col-
ombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Israel, Liechten-
stein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United
States of America, and Yugoslavia.
1, 1960 Study, supra note 12, at 43-44.
i' 50 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 4) at 48-49, U.N. Doc. E/4949; E/CN.4/1068 (1971). Conscien-
tious objection was included on the agenda of the Commission on Human Rights after an
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context in which to consider conscientious objection because it is
generally the young who are required to perform military service. 6
However, the discussion of conscientious objection before the Com-
mission proved to be a matter of serious disagreement between
representatives on the Commission. Three general opinions
developed. One group advocated the recognition of conscientious
objection and the provision of alternative forms of service. 7 A sec-
ond group considered military service a universal duty for which
no exceptions could be made. For those representatives, defense
of one's country was not a matter of freedom of conscience. In-
stead, one who refused to bear arms could be considered only an
unethical coward. 8 A third group of representatives from develop-
ing countries noted that their countries were in no position to allow
such an exemption, given their vulnerable political status and in-
ferior level of economic development. 9 Despite the differences of
opinion, the Commission adopted Resolution llB, which requested
that the Secretary-General prepare updated information on national
legislation relating to conscientious objection, and further resolved
to study specifically the question of conscientious objection when
the report became available. 0
In 1972, the Secretary-General prepared a report on the Role
of Youth in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: The
question of conscientious objection to military service"' (hereinafter
appeal was made by the Pax Romana requesting recognition of conscientious objection
to military service as a human right. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/NGO/153 at 3 (1970).
1" Schaffer & Weissbrodt, supra note 1, at 35. The authors point out that in some coun-
tries, including the German Democratic Republic, South Africa, and the Philippines, military
training begins as early as 10 or 12 years of age.
17 50 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 4) at 48, para. 203, U.N. Doc. E/4949//E/CN.4/1068 (1971).
18 Id. at 48, para. 204. The prevailing opinion of this group was that "the entire question
should be left to national governments rather than made a subject for international con-
sideration .. " Id.
"1 Id. at 48, para. 205.
' Id. at 88. Resolution lB (XXVII) was adopted by 18 votes to 3, with 7 abstentions.
Id. at 49, para. 211.
1 1972 Report, supra note 13, at 12-72. This portion of the report distinguished between
member nations that had no compulsory military service (Bahrain, Barbados, Bhutan,
Botswana, Canada, Democractic Yemen, Fiji, Iceland, Jamaica, Japan, Kuwait, Lesotho,
Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland); those which had compulsory military service and provisions relating to conscien-
tious objection and/or alternative service (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark,
Finland, France, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and United
States of America); and those which had compulsory military service but made no provi-
sion for conscientious objectors (Argentina, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Cyprus, Greece, Guatemala,
Hungary, Iran, Italy, Ivory Coast, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Niger, Philippines,
Portugal, Singapore, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia).
The 57 countries that responded in 1972 included 17 responses from countries that also
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1972 Report), for submission to the Commission on Human Rights.
The 1972 Report was only a compilation of national legislation from
member nations on conscientious objection, and did not purport
to address the issue of conscientious objection to war and military
service as a human right. For example, the United States reported
at that time 2 that conscientious objection to military service and
alternative service were provided for legislatively in section 6(j) of
the Military Selective Service Act.' By 1980, many of the legislative
provisions had been amended, repealed, or allowed to expire, and
the 1972 Report was representative of only one-third of the
membership of the United Nations. In the interim a significant
development had occurred: the United Nations General Assembly
adopted Resolution 33/165, which recognized for the first time, "the
right of all persons to refuse service in military or police forces
which are used to enforce apartheid."2' The significance of such
a measure must not be underestimated. The objection to compulsory
enforcement of apartheid strikes at the conscience of all who pur-
port to adhere to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."6
This qualified recognition of conscientious objection by the General
Assembly, coupled with additional factors including: (1) the failure
of the 1972 Report to address conscientious objection as a basic
human right, (2) the recognition that many of the legislative provi-
sions were inapplicable by 1980, and (3) the acknowledgment that
the 1972 Report was inadequately representative of the United
Nations membership, resulted in proposals by non-governmental
organizations and governments that led the Commission on Human
Rights to request an update of the 1972 Report.7 In 1980, the
contributed to the 1960 Study, and 40 additional responses from countries that did not
participate earlier. Seven countries, which had previously contributed to the 1960 Study,
failed to respond in 1972. See 1960 Study Monographs, supra note 13, at 4-11.
' 1972 Report, supra note 13, at 65.
23 See supra note 4. Section 456(j) also provides that, "[any person claiming exemption
from combatant training and service because of such conscientious objections . . . shall
•.. be assigned to noncombatant service ... or shall, if he is found to be conscientiously
opposed to participation in such non-combatant service, in lieu of induction, be ordered
• ..to perform ...such civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national
health, safety, or interest as the Director may deem appropriate." 50 U.S.C. app. S 456(j)
(1976). But see infra note 46 and accompanying text.
' U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/NGO/289 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Statement by International
League for Human Rights].
25 G.A. Res. 33/165, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 154, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1979).
,' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art 2, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948).
' See 1980 Statement by International League for Human Rights, supra note 24; U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4JNGO/286 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Statement by Friends World Com-
mittee for Consultation]; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.1528 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Draft
Resolution]. Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, and the Netherlands submitted the 1980 Draft
Resolution that was adopted by the Commission on Human Rights by a vote of 23 to 2,
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Secretary-General responded to the Commission's request by
presenting a report 8 that also was limited to compiling informa-
tion on national legislation received from thirty-six member
nations.'
The United Nations has continued to serve as a forum on the
issue of conscientious objection to military service. Nongovern-
mental organizations persist in their efforts to secure the express
acknowledgment of conscientious objection as a basic human right
under international law.' However, these efforts have produced
varied results recently. During its thirty-seventh session in 1981,
the Commission on Human Rights adopted two divergent resolu-
tions on the question of conscientious objection.31 Resolution 39
was introduced by the representatives of the Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic and was adopted without a vote.2 Yet the words
"conscientious objection" are not to be found in the text of Resolu-
tion 39. Instead, the emphasis is placed upon the right of a coun-
try to overcome threats to national sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity and to ensure the implementation of youth programs for
the economic and social development of the country.3 In marked
contrast to this retrenchment on conscientious objection was the
with 15 abstentions. 1980 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 3) at 106-07, 198-99, U.N. Doc. E/1980/13
(1980).
" U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1419, Add. 1-5 (1980); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1509 (1981) [hereinafter cited
together as 1980 Report]. Member nations that had no compulsory military service in 1980
include: Bahamas, Barbados, Costa Rica, Ghana, Grenada, Iceland, Lebanon, Mauritius, Oman,
Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Togo, United Kingdom, and United States. Countries report-
ing that compulsory military service did exist and that provisions relating to conscientious
objection were in effect include: Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany,
Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Suriname, and Sweden. Member nations that
had compulsory military service but made no provision for conscientious objection include:
Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, Panama, Tonga, and
Yugoslavia.
29 Id. The level of response from member nations dropped from-57 nations in 1972 to
36 nations in 1980. These figures reflect the following: nineteen of the 36 countries responded
in both reports; seventeen other countries responded only in 1980 (two of these had par-
ticipated in the 1960 Study, however); a total of 38 countries, which had previously con-
tributed to the 1972 Report, failed to respond in 1980. See 1972 Report, supra note 13,
at 12-72; 1960 Study Monographs, supra note 13, at 4-11.
Whether this decline reflects a corresponding lack of concern by the member nations
on the issue of conscientious objection, is a conjectural matter. It may be a significant
indicium in the event conscientious objection as a basic human right is presented for con-
sideration by the Commission on Human Rights and subsequently by the General Assembly.
' U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/NGO/292 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Statement by Friends World
Committee for Consultation]; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/NGO/308 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981
Statement by International League for Human Rights].
, 1981 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 5) at 137, 24244, U.N. Doc. E/1981/25//E/CN.4/1475 (1981).
32 Id. at 242-43.
33 Id.
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resolution presented by the representative of the Netherlands."
Resolution 40 failed to receive the popular support shown its
counterpart," but did lead to a request that the Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
prepare a study on conscientious objection to be presented to the
Commission on Human Rights.3 It is this study that prompts the
present consideration of conscientious objection in this Note.37
The concept of conscientious objection as a specific human right
was recognized on the international level first by a Resolution of
the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly ' (hereinafter Resolu-
tion 337), which was based upon the Report on the Right of Con-
scientious Objection presented to the Assembly by the Legal
Committee 9 (hereinafter Council of Europe Report). The Con-
sultative Assembly declared that: "Persons liable to conscription
for military service who, for reasons of conscience or profound con-
viction arising from religious, ethical, moral, humanitarian,
philosophical or similar motives, refuse to perform armed service
shall enjoy a personal right to be released from the obligation to
perform such service."'"
Conspicuously absent from this declaration is any political motive
upon which an objector might base a conviction. It appears that
selective conscientious objection 1 based merely on political motives
would be an impermissible ground of objection. The Council of
Id. at 243-44.
Resolution 40 was adopted by a vote of 25 to 3, with 12 abstentions. Id. at 137.
Id. at 244.
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1512; E/CN.4/Sub. 2/495 at 67-68, 87-88 (1981).
Resolution of the Eur. Consult. Ass., 18th Sess., Res. No. 337 (1967).
Report of the Legal Committee, Eur. Consult. Ass., 18th Sess., Doc. No. 2170 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Council of Europe Report].
'0 Resolution 337, supra note 38, at 1.
, Greenawalt defines the selective conscientious objector as one who objects to a par-
ticular war as unjust, based upon a variety of moral principles. For a war to be just, the
following conditions must be satisfied:
(1) The cause must be just; (2) war must be the last resort to secure justice;
(3) war must be declared by constituted public authority; (4) there must be a
reasonable prospect of victory; (5) the means used must be proportionate to the
good likely to be achieved; (6) the government's intention must be just, free of
vindictive hatred; (7) if victorious, the victor should treat the vanquished with
mercy; (8) the war must be waged by just means, rather than such prohibited
means as direct attack on noncombatants, excessive violence to combatants, and
harsh treatment of prisoners.
Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 51.
Whether the threat of nuclear warfare would apply to the last condition is a disputed ques-
tion. More importantly, it is unclear whether the failure to satisfy only one of the condi-
tions will give rise to a valid selective conscientious objection. It is difficult to imagine
a "just war" in which all of these conditions would be satisfied.
1982]
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Europe Report indicated that an individual must be prevented from
obtaining conscientious objector status in the event his conviction
is insincere or based upon an objection to certain wars or forms of
warfare. 2 Thus, if conscientious objection, as recognized by the
Council of Europe, is to be considered a basic human right, it must
be viewed as a qualified human right, at best.
It also has been argued that conscientious objection to military
service is a right implicit in article 18 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights,4" which states that: "Everyone has the right
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion ... .'"" Neither posi-
tion has gained approval from the General Assembly, yet the need
exists for an elaboration of the standards for the treatment of con-
scientious objectors. A review of the United States approach, which
follows, may assist in the development of international standards
for the treatment of conscientious objection to military service.45
III. UNITED STATES APPROACH
A. Overview
The authority of the Selective Service System to induct per-
sons for training and service in the Armed Forces expired on July
1, 1973.46 As the Armed Forces of the United States now are based
upon an all-volunteer program, the questions of conscientious objec-
tion and alternative service for inductees no longer arises. 7 It is
important to note, however, that the Military Selective Service
Act was not repealed, so it remains an accurate statement of United
States law.
42 Council of Europe Report, supra note 39, at 7. Examples of such objections to specific
warfare included: objection to active service on foreign soil or in a colonialist venture;
objection to a war in which the threat of the use of nuclear weapons exists; and objection
to military service while an involved country is divided. Id.
"3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948). See 1980 State-
ment by International League for Human Rights, supra note 24, at 3; 1980 Statement by
Friends World Committee for Consultation, supra note 27, at 1.
" Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948). Compare art.
18 with U.S. CONST. amend. I (the first amendment does not recognize the right to freedom
of thought or conscience explicitly; it does provide for the right to freedom of speech and
press).
"5 See also 1980 Statement by Friends World Committe for Consultation, supra note 27,
at 1. This nongovernmental organization requested that the Commission on Human Rights
particularly consider the organization of alternative service and measures to prevent the
abusive practice of imposing prison sentences on the conscientious objector who refuses
military service and/or alternative service.
," 50 U.S.C. app. S 467(c) (1976). "[N]o person shall be inducted for training and service
in the Armed Forces after July 1, 1973. Id.
,1 1980 Report, supra note 28, at 10.
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For those persons who already have entered the military ser-
vice, Defense Department regulations allow administrative
discharge or an assignment to noncombatant training and service
based upon conscientious objection." Section 75.3 defines conscien-
tious objection as "[a] firm, fixed and sincere objection to participa-
tion in war in any form or the bearing of arms, by reason of religious
training and belief." 9 However, the privilege of conscientious ob-
jection is waived by military personnel who possessed valid con-
scientious objection beliefs before entering military service but
failed to request classification as a conscientious objector.0
Exemption from military service has existed in one form or
another in the United States beginning with exemption from colo-
nial militias of those required to serve during the Revolutionary
War. " More recently, the exemption for conscientious objection
during World War II was extended to one who "by reason of
religious training and belief"'52 was opposed to participation in war
in any form. The rationale of Congress underlying this provision
was that conscience is a matter of individual belief and does not
result merely from membership in a pacifist sect.53 However,
Jehovah's Witnesses could not claim individually to be opposed
to participation in war in any form, because their religion required
them to fight on Judgment Day. Instead, their claim was based
upon the exemption allowed for ministers, as each member of their
sect is considered to be a minister. This claim was denied routinely,
8 Conscientious Objectors, 32 C.F.R. SS 75.1-.11 (1981).
" Id. at S 75.3.
0 Id. at S 75.4. If a member of the Armed Forces requested classification before enter-
ing military service and such a request was denied, any subsequent request based upon
essentially the same grounds is barred. There exists one exception to this rule of waiver.
Review for classification as a conscientious objector will be granted to a member of the
Armed Forces who possessed conscientious objector beliefs before entering military ser-
vice upon two conditions: first, if such beliefs crystalized after receipt of an induction
notice, and second, if Selective Service System regulations prohibited the submission of
requests for conscientious objection classification after receipt of induction notice. Id. See
also 32 C.F.R. S 739, 888.1(e) (1981) (implementing uniform procedures for the discharge
of conscientious objectors from the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force).
51 Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 35. The exemption may have been limited to those who
were members of a particular religious sect, those who could pay the prescribed fee, or
those who could hire a substitute. For the U.S. approach to conscientious objection during
the Civil War and World War I, see id. at 35-36 and CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA, supra note
7, at 88-186. Of particular interest is the Draft Act of 1917 provision, which restricted the
exemption to those persons belonging to a "well-recognized sect or organization at present
organized and existing and whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to par-
ticipate in wars in any form." Draft Act of 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76, 78 (1917).
' Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, S 5(g), 54 Stat. 885, 889 (1940).
' Comment, Conscientious Objection and the First Amendment, 14 AKRON L. REV. 71, 73
(1980).
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and consequently many Jehovah's Witnesses were sentenced to
prison.'
The "greatest single innovation"5 of the World War II draft
legislation was the provision for Civilian Public Service camps,
which enabled conscientious objectors to perform nonmilitary alter-
native service.56 The major defect in the administration of the
Civilian Public Service camp program was the refusal to pay the
conscientious objector wages for the work he performed. The con-
scientious objector may have received a stipend for maintenance
(not exceeding $15.00 per month), but the balance of the earnings
was paid by the employer to the United States Treasury. 7 The
conscientious objector was denied comparable military pay, life and
health insurance benefits and the family was refused dependency
allowances." Obviously, the families of imprisoned conscientious
objectors suffered similar hardships.
In 1948, Congress responded to a conflict between the Second
and Ninth Circuits' over the interpretation of "religious training
and belief' in section 5(g) of the 1940 Draft Act by enacting sec-
tion 6(j) of the Military Service Act (hereinafter 1948 Draft Act).'
'" See CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA, supra note 7, at 180; J. CORNELL, THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJEC-
TOR AND THE LAW 67-68 (1943) [hereinafter cited as J. CORNELL, THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJEC-
TOR]. By July 1, 1943, 2071 conscientious objectors were convicted of Selective Service Law
violations. Of this number, more than one-fourth were Jehovah's Witnesses. Id. at 67. By
the end of the war, 5,300 conscientious objectors were prosecuted, 4,300 of whom were
Jehovah's Witnesses. CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA, supra note 7, at 216. The average prison
sentence served by the conscientious objector was 30.6 months, although at the same time
the overall average for federal prisoners was 22.1 months. J. CORNELL, CONSCIENCE AND
THE STATE 15 (1944) [hereinafter cited as J. CORNELL, CONSCIENCE AND THE STATE].
'5 CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA, supra note 7, at 215.
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Ch. 720, S 5(g), 54 Stat. 885, 889 (1940).
Section 5(g) provided that "[a]ny such person claiming such exemption from combatant train-
ing and service because of such conscientious objection ... shall ... be assigned to noncom-
batant service ... or shall, if he is found to be conscientiously opposed to participation
in such noncombatant service, in lieu of induction, be assigned to work of national impor-
tance under civilian direction." Id.
5 J. CORNELL, CONSCIENCE AND THE STATE, supra note 54, at 40-41.
"See CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA, supra note 7, at 215-16. The congressional and military posi-
tion was that the conscientious objector was not exposed to the same risks as the solider
and therefore he did not deserve to be paid. Congress refused to provide assistance to
the dependent families, even though it could have decided to appropriate the funds out
of the earnings deposited with the U.S. Treasury. "The very fact that a man does not
get paid is one means of sorting the conscientious objector from the slacker." Id. at 216
(statement of Lewis F. Koch before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in 1942).
" Compare United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943) (expansive interpreta-
tion of language to include conscientious social belief), with Berman v. United States, 156
F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946) (strict construction of language limited to an individual's belief
in a higher authority).
0 Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, title I, S 6(j), 62 Stat. 604, 612-13 (1948).
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Congress adopted the Ninth Circuit construction and specified that
"religious training and belief' was to be interpreted as "an in-
dividual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not
include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or
a merely personal moral code.""1 While it would appear that this
amendment had little direct impact upon conscientious objectors
during the Korean conflict, the question of conscientious objection
during that conflict was not as volatile an issue as it had been
during World War II.62
The amendment of the conscientious objection exemption in the
1948 Draft Act gave rise to two distinct issues during the Viet-
nam conflict. The first challenge involved those who objected to
war for deeply held ethical, but not religious, reasons." The sec-
ond concerned the ability to object to a particular war as unjust."
Both of these challenges reflected the then prevailing opposition
to United States military involvement in Vietnam, an opposition
held in various United States quarters for a variety of reasons."'
The extent of the opposition may be gauged by the reaction of
the registrants who burned their draft cards in protest." Congress
responded to these symbolic acts by making it a felony to destroy
and/or mutilate a draft card..
61 Id. at 613. For a summary of the legislative history of S 6(j) see Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333, 348-50 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
According to one author, slightly more than 50 prosecutions involving conscientious
objectors were reported during the Korean conflict. See CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA, supra note
7, at 217.
" See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text; United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
" See infra notes 94-101 and accompanying text; Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971). See supra note 41. The resolution of these issues contributed to the present concept
of conscientious objection and its dimensions. These cases will be analyzed later in this
Note in that context.
" For a discussion of the justiciability of challenges to the use of U.S. military forces
in Vietnam, see J. MOORE, LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR 570-98 (1972). That author points
out that the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari to review certain claims that it
treated as nonjusticiable political issues. Specifically, the four major claims considered were
that: "American involvement has not been constitutionally authorized; ... American par-
ticipation is in violation of international law; ... the method of conducting hostilities violates
international law; and ... participation in the war will entail personal responsibility under
the Nuremberg principles .... Id. at 571-72. See also R. HULL & J. NOVOGROD, LAW AND
VIETNAM 169-87 (1968) (addressing the constitutional aspects of the United States involve-
ment in Vietnam). See generally 1-4 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Falk
ed. 1976) (a four volume classic containing essays on the international ramifications of the
Vietnam war).
CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA, supra note 7, at 256.
' Pub. L. No. 89-152, 79 Stat. 586 (1965) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. S 462(b)(3)
(1976)). A person who "knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes
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The question of conscientious objection to military service is
raised once again due to the reinstitution of registration procedures
by former President Jimmy Carter on July 8, 1980.8 President
Ronald Reagan has decided to continue the process of peacetime
registration.' President Reagan emphasized that continued registra-
tion was not an indication that conscription also would be
reinstituted. "Make no mistake: The continuation of peace time
registration does not foreshadow a return to the draft .... Only
in the most severe national emergency does the Government have
a claim to the mandatory service of its young people."70
B. Analysis of United States Law
1. Valid Grounds for Conscientious Objection
The Constitution of the United States does not recognize ex-
plicitly a right to conscientious objection to military service. In-
stead, Congress has elected to grant a privilege of exemption to
"any person ... who by reason of religious training and belief, is
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. As
used in this subsection, the term 'religious training and belief does
not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views,
or a merely personal code."71 This provision is limited in its ap-
any such [registration] certificate" was subject to be fined not in excess of $10,000, or im-
prisoned for not more than five years, or both. Id.
11 Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,247 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. app. at
16 (West 1981). After the Vietnam conflict had ended, President Gerald R. Ford terminated
the procedures established for registration under 50 U.S.C. app. S 453. See Proclamation
No. 4360, 40 Fed. Reg. 14,567 (1975), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. app. at 15 (West 1981).
6 President's Statement on Continuation of the Registration Program, 18 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 8 (January 11, 1982).
70 Id. Male citizens born in calendar year 1960 and thereafter are required to register
upon attaining their eighteenth birthday. See Proclamation No. 4771, supra note 68. Mr.
Reagan provided a grace period for those who have failed to register under Proclamation
No. 4771. President's Statement on Continuation of the Registration Program, supra note
69, at 8. Beginning March 1, 1982 the Selective Service System requires "full compliance"
with 50 U.S.C. app. S 453 and "any person .. .who otherwise evades or refuses registra-
tion . . . shall .. .be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine
of not more than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment." 50 U.S.C. app. S 462(a)
(1976). See Notes of telephone interview with Paul Knapp, Attorney with the Policy Develop-
ment Department of the Selective Service Administration (Feb. 24, 1982) (available in Georgia
Journal of International and Comparative Law Offices). But see Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57 (1981). Although the issue in that case dealt with the constitutionality of Selective
Service registration limited to males, Justice Rehnquist stated that the purpose of registra-
tion is to prepare for a draft of combat troops. Id. at 77.
To date, prosecutions for failure to register have totalled five in number. Each of these
defendants refused based upon conscientious objection to military service. See Selective
Prosecution Argued in Draft Cases, 68 AM. BAR Assoc. J. 1554 (1982).
71 50 U.S.C. app. S 456(j) (1976). But see infra notes 187, 204-05, 217-18 and accompanying
text for alternative approaches to conscientious objection.
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plication to persons prior to their induction into the Armed Forces.
Induction is effective upon the administration of an oath of
allegiance and the act of a registrant who steps forward upon
command." Once inducted, a member of the Armed Forces may
be discharged or assigned to noncombatant duties only because
of a privilege granted by the executive branch of the federal govern-
ment, and not as a constitutional right nor under 'any statutory
provision .
The Department of Defense procudures delineate the recognized
grounds for military discharge as a conscientious objector quite
specifically. There exist two categories of conscientious objector:
first, a person with a firm, fixed and sincere objection to participa-
tion of any kind in war in any form by reason of religious training
and belief;74 and second, a person with a firm, fixed and sincere
objection to participation as a combatant in war in any form, by
reason of religious training and belief, but whose convictions are
such as to permit military service in a noncombatant status.75
Religious training and belief is interpreted as a belief in an exter-
nal power or being, or it may be a deeply held moral or ethical
belief.7" Either kind of belief must be the ultimate controlling force
in the individual's life, and may not be based solely upon political
views."
72 2 SEL. SERv. L. REP. (PUB. L. EDUC. INST.) 1083 (1968). The action of "stepping forward"
is considered conclusive evidence of one's intent to be inducted into the Armed Forces.
" See Hopkins v. Schlesinger, 515 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1975). That case made it explicit
that the "Army is under neither a statutory nor a constitutional obligation to provide for
the discharge of a conscientious objector. However, once the Army promulgates a policy
of allowing discharge on grounds of conscientious objection, it must apply that policy with
an even hand." Id. at 1227.
" Conscientious Objectors, 32 C.F.R. S 75.3 (1981).
75 Id. These two categories also apply to a registrant who seeks conscientious objection
classification. Under the first category, a registrant is classified, "1-0: Conscientious objec-
tor available for alternative service." The second classification is "1-A-0." Such an objector
is available for noncombatant military service.
7' (b) Religious training and belief Belief in an external power or being or deeply held
moral or ethical belief, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else
is ultimately dependent, and which has the power or force to affect moral well-
being. The external power or being need not be of an orthodox deity, but may
be a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a
place parallel to that filled by the God of another, or, in the case of deeply held
moral or ethical beliefs, a belief held with the strength and devotion of tradi-
tional religious conviction. The term 'religious training and belief may include
solely moral or ethical beliefs even though the applicant himself may not
characterize these beliefs as 'religious' in the traditional sense, or may expressly
characterize them as not religious. The term 'religious training and belief does
not include a belief which rests solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism,
expediency, or political views.
Id. at S 75.3(b).
"Id.
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If Congress decides to reinstate the draft, present registrants
will need to follow the procedures in part 3 of this section to claim
conscientious objection status.78 The recent regulations with respect
to deferment and exemption from military service outline the
specific grounds for claiming conscientious objection.79 There ex-
ist three grounds for conscientious objection classification. First,
a registrant's objection may be founded upon religious training
and belief." Second, the objection may be based upon strictly
religious beliefs.81 Finally, the objection may be based upon per-
sonal beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source or content,82
provided that, they occupy in the objector's life a place parallel
to that filled by belief in a Supreme Being for those holding more
traditional religious views. The decision of the board in each of
these instances is based upon the consistency of the objector's
statements and the sincerity of his objection."
2. Concept and Dimensions of Conscientious Objection
The concept of conscientious objection in the United States is
reflected accurately in the aforementioned grounds for valid
classification. The evolution and dimensions of the concept of con-
scientious objection initially depended upon the construction Con-
gress mandated in the legislative provisions permitting such an
" Registrants under 50 U.S.C. app. S 453 are classified administratively in Class 1-H.
See Amendments to Regulations with Respect to Deferment of Exemption from Military
Service, 47 Fed. Reg. 4,640, 4,652 (1982) (to be codified at scattered sections of 32 C.F.R.
SS 1602-53). This class contains those registrants not subject to processing for induction
and thus not available for unrestricted military service.
No consideration of conscientious objection is made until: (1) the registrant has received
an order to report for induction, or (2) the Director of the Selective Service System has
made a specific request for submission of claims and documents in support of claims. Id.
at 4,656 (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. S 1636.2). Neither condition is presently in effect.
I The new regulations provide a much more detailed definition of the basis for classifica-
tion as a conscientious objector than the grounds provided in 50 U.S.C. app. S 456(j). Com-
pare 47 Fed. Reg. 4,640, 4,655-57 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. SS 1636.1-10) with 50
U.S.C. app. S 456(j) (1976).
' 47 Fed. Reg. 4,640, 4,656 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. SS 1636.3-4).
I1 d.
Id. See also id. (to be codified at S 1636.6). That regulation provides additional exten-
sive guidelines to assist the board in analyzing the religious training and belief require-
ment; e.g., Board members may not reject as invalid the beliefs of the conscientious objector
because they find them incomprehensible or inconsistent with their own beliefs.
" Id. at 4,657 (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. S 1636.10). Additional considerations relevant
to a determination of the registrant's sincerity include: documentary evidence, oral
statements of the registrant or his witnesses, his general demeanor, the timing of the
crystallization of his conscientious objection, consistency of actions with stated beliefs, and
supplemental letter of reference. Id. at 4,657-58 (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. S 1636.8).
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exemption. With the exception of one amendment in 1967," the
legislative grant of a conscientious objection exemption has re-
mained unaltered since the 1948 Draft Act.85 Since that Act, the
dimensions of conscientious objection have been circumscribed by
the United States Supreme Court in three landmark decisions
rendered in the wake of the Vietnam conflict.86
In United States v. Seege 7 the Supreme Court considered the
conscientious objector exemption claims of three individuals who
did not adhere to any traditional religious belief or being. At that
time, 1965, section 456(j) required that one's religious training and
belief be in relation to a Supreme Being. Seeger challenged the
constitutionality of this provision claiming that: (1) the refusal to
exempt nonreligious conscientious objectors under section 456(j)
was a violation of the first amendment protection of the establish-
ment and free exercise of religion; and (2) the discrimination be-
tween different forms of religious expression violated the fifth
amendment due process clause." However, the Court did not rule
on the constitutional issues in Seeger. Instead, the religious train-
ing and belief requirement was interpreted as "a sincere and mean-
ingful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying
for the exemption . . . ."" The effect of this construction was to
avoid the constitutional challenges that would have required the
invalidation of the statute." The benefit of this approach was that
" Pub. L. No. 90-94, S 1(7), 81 Stat. 100, 104 (1967) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
app. S 456(j) (1976)). This amendment struck the provision that required that religious training
and belief stem from an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation. Congress was responding to the United
States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Seeger, which interpreted "in a relation
to a Supreme Being" to mean "whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful oc-
cupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in
God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption." 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1964).
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Seeger, 380 US. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
" 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Id. at 165. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The fifth amendment provides that "No person shall . . .be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . U.S. CONST. amend. V.
u 380 U.S. 163, 176.
By reviewing the legislative history of the 1948 Draft Act and interpreting section
456(j), the Court avoided "imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious
beliefs, exempting some and excluding others, and is in accord with the well-established
congressional policy of equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded
in their religious tenets." Id.
The Court gave specific directions to local boards and lower courts for their determina-
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it provided the lower courts with a somewhat objective test for
reviewing conscientious objection claims, and indicated to Congress
that the "Supreme Being" terminology no longer would be accep-
table. Religion could not be preferred over non-religion.
The approach by the Court in Seeger was directed at the posi-
tion the belief occupies in one's life, not at the question of the ex-
istence of some Supreme Being. In a subsequent case, Welsh v.
United States,9 the Court applied the Seeger parallel belief test
and held that the conscientious objection exemption requires that
"all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical,
or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed
themselves to become a part of an instrument of war,"92 be ex-
empted from military service. The combined result of Seeger and
Welsh is to expand the scope of the conscientious objection ex-
emption by effectively eliminating the religious training and belief
requirement of the statute. At the same time, the Welsh decision
excludes two groups of registrants from the conscientious objec-
tion exemption: (1) those whose beliefs are not deeply held, and
(2) those whose objection to war rests solely upon considerations
of policy, pragmatism, or expediency, rather than moral, ethical,
or religious principle. 3
That the Supreme Court has been unwilling to develop a limitless
exemption for conscientious objection is shown also by Gillette v.
United States," wherein the Supreme Court rejected two claims
of conscientious objection to participation in a particular war. The
claimant's objections were found to have been sincere, but they
focused only upon participation in the Vietnam conflict, which they
considered an unjust war. 5 In reviewing these claims, the Supreme
Court concluded that the congressional exemption for conscientious
opposition to "participation in war in any form" was intended to
extend only to those who oppose participation in all war. 6 The
tion of the validity of a registrant's claim. They are "not free to reject beliefs because
they consider them 'incomprehensible.' Their task is to decide whether the beliefs professed
by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things,
religious." Id. at 185.
1 398 U.S. 333 (1970). As the Court in Welsh noted, Congress deleted the "Supreme Be-
ing" terminology from section 456(j) in 1967. Id. at 336 n. 2. See supra note 84.
'3 398 U.S. at 344.
" Id. at 342-43.
401 U.S. 437 (1971).
" Id. at 439-41. Gillette was opposed to participation in the Vietnam conflict, but was
willing to participate in a war of national defense or a United Nations peace-keeping task
force. Id. at 439.
" Id. at 447. The Court emphasized that this would be true regardless of the sincerity
of the claimant or religious character of his objection.
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Court also held that there was no violation of the establishment
or exercise clauses of the first amendment, generally because sec-
tion 456(j) does not discriminate, on its face, on the basis of religious
belief or affiliation.97 While the Court in Gillette finally addressed
the constitutional issues directly, it failed to enunciate the proper
test to be applied in selective objection cases, and did not explain
how the government had met its burden of proof. 8
For Justice Douglas, dissenting in Gillette, the question the ma-
jority failed to address was whether a man can be compelled against
his conscience to kill.99 He was the only member of the Court to
argue that a right of free exercise of conscience or belief is im-
plied in the first amendment. 0 Justice Douglas reminded the ma-
'7 Id. at 450. Justice Marshall found that neutral considerations, e.g., the incorporation
of a conscientious objector into military life, supported the existence of the exemption
that was not designed to favor any religion. Additionally, the government's interest in
maintaining a fair system for military conscription was sufficiently neutral to justify limiting
the exemption to objectors to all war. Therefore, section 456(j) could not have been said
to reflect a religious preference. Id. at 452, 454-55. Justice Marshall's concern appears to
have been centered on the impact upon military capacity if selective objection were recognized
as a right implicit in the Constitution.
See Sheffer, The Free Exercise of Religion and Selective Conscientious Objection: A Judicial
Response to a Moral Problem, 9 CAP. U. L. REv. 7, 24 (1979). That article analyzes three lower
federal court decisions that recognized selective conscientious objection. See United States
v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969) (ruling that in balancing individual rights against
government need to conscript men to fight in Vietnam, the demand of conscience outweighed
the need to fight), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 267 (1970); Koster v. Sharp, 303 F. Supp.
837 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (conscience, not religion, was the standard to be applied); United States
v. McFadden, 309 F. Supp. 502.(N.D. Cal. 1970), affd, 423 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated
and remanded, 401 U.S. 1006 (1971), rev'd, 462 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1972) (district court on
remand was ordered to dismiss the indictment). It is noteworthy that the court in McFad-
den held that to require that the objection be directed at participation in all wars violated
the free exercise of religion clause; efficiency, troop morale, and manpower quotas were
not sufficiently compelling to justify such invidious discrimination and therefore equal pro-
tection and due process of law were violated. 309 F. Supp. at 508. Although the Supreme
Court vacated and remanded McFadden for consideration in light of its decision in Gillette,
the Ninth Circuit sustained McFadden's defense of former jeopardy and refused to con-
sider the contentions of the government, 462 F.2d at 486. No direct evidence of the reason
for the government's failure to appeal the decision was available, but the date of the deci-
sion coincides with the reduced U.S. military involvement in Vietnam and it is conceivable
that the government may have considered it no longer necessary to pursue the matter.
For a discussion of the consistency of the Supreme Court holdings and rationale in Welsh
and Gillette, compare Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 41-67 (the decision in Gillette extended
to Congress the requisite degree of legislative deference), with Meiklejohn, Conscientious
Objection in the Supreme Court: Welsh and Gillette, 8 CuM. L. REv. 1 (1977) (the Court's opin-
ion in Welsh compels acceptance of selective conscientious objection; the holding in Gillette
is inconsistent).
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. at 464.
10 Id. at 465-66. "Yet conscience and belief are the main ingredients of First Amend-
ment rights. They are the bedrock of free speech as well as religion." Id.
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jority that the establishment clause prohibits invidious discrimina-
tion; therefore specific objectors must receive equal treatment with
general objectors if their objection is based on similar grounds
of religion and conscience."U The validity of this argument is ques-
tionable for the present time, in light of the eight to one decision
in Gillette.
The direct application of the decision in Gillette subsided after
the induction authority expired in 1973.202 However, when the deci-
sion was made in 1980 to reinstitute registration procedures, 3 Con-
gress and the Selective Service System were provided an oppor-
tunity to review the concept and parameters of the conscientious
objection exemption. It was recommended in a 1979 Selective Ser-
vice System report on conscientious objection, that there be a:
[c]omplete rescission of the conscientious objector exemption...;
and as an alternative, restriction of the conscientious objector
exemption to practicing members of religious sects that specifically
prohibit participation in military service, elimination of the re-
quirement that reason be given for the denial of a claim .. ., and
a specification that Selective Service determination on claims shall
not be subject to review by another agency, official, or court of
the United States .... 20
President Carter proposed a program of compulsory lottery-based
national service that would have consisted of a military draft with
a civilian compulsory service attached.'5 A lottery would have been
used to determine who would serve, and those selected would have
been required to choose military or civilian service.06 This pro-
Id. at 469. See also Sheffer, supra note 98, at 23. At no time has the Supreme Court
held that a right of free exercise of conscience emanates from the penumbra of the Bill
of Rights, nor have classifications of conscience been found invidious. One of these findings
would be required to find a violation of the fifth amendment's due process clause.
0 See supra note 46.
"o See supra note 68.
1 Judiciary Implications of Draft Registration, 1980: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1980) (statement of Joseph W. Elder, Professor, Univ. of Wisconsin-
Madison, which includes a quotation from the Selective Service System's report on con-
scientious objectors, by Major Donald A. Gurwitz, prepared for Colonel Walter Thompson
in the summer of 1979).
10 PRESIDENTIAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SELECTIVE SERVICE REFORM OF FEBRUARY 11, 1980,
H. R. Doc. No. 265, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-59 (1980).
104 Id. at 57-58. Constitutional challenges have been suggested to be inherent in these
types of proposals. See Comment; supra note 53, at 72. If Congress narrowed the exemp-
tion, resulting in one religion being favored over another religion or even non-religion,
the first amendment establishment clause might be violated. Abolition of the exemption
might violate the first amendment free exercise clause. Proposals of compulsory civilian
376 [Vol. 12:359
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
gram would have eliminated the conscientious objector exemption.
The recent release of regulations with respect to deferment or
exemption from military service indicates that the Selective Ser-
vice has decided to maintain the concept of conscientious objec-
tion as applied in section 456(j) and under the interpretations of
the Supreme Court in Seeger, Welsh, and Gillette.
3. The Procedures for Obtaining the Status of Conscientious
Objector
Registrants are presently unable to submit claims or other
documents to be classified as conscientious objectors available for
either alternative service or for noncombatant military service.
In the event that the Director of the Selective Service Administra-
tion requests submission of such claims, or induction orders are
issued, only then may the classification proceedings begin.'
The local boards, generally in each county, shall have the author-
ity to consider and determine all claims by registrants."" Each
registrant first must submit in writing his claim for exemption
and any documents in support of claims."0 9 After his claim is
filed with the local board, a personal appearance is scheduled for
the presentation of witnesses and other evidence."' The failure
to appear does not bar the conscientious objection claim automatic-
ally. A second personal appearance is scheduled, but failure to ap-
pear on that occasion will be excused only by the filing of a timely
written explanation and the determination of the board that the
failure to appear was for good cause.' The registrant who cannot
show good cause is considered to have waived his opportunity to
claim exemption as a conscientious objector.
At the personal appearance the registrant presents all relevant
information available to him. Oral testimony must be summarized
service, such as President Carter's, might violate the thirteenth amendment prohibition
against involuntary servitude, especially in the absence of induction. There also would be
various statutory challenges involved.
07 Deferment or Exemption From Military Service, 47 Fed. Reg. 4,640, 4,656 (1982) (to
be codified at 32 C.F.R. SS 1636.2-3). But see infra notes 188-95, 226 and accompanying text
for the German and Brazilian procedural regulations.
'o Id. at 4,661 (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. S 1648.1).
Id. at 4,656 (to be codified at 32 C..R. SS 16362-3).
01 Id. at 4,661 (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. S 1648.4(a)). A registrant generally is restricted
to presenting the testimony of three witnesses. The registrant may request that these
proceedings be open to the public. Id. at 4,661-62 (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. SS 1648.5(c),
1648.5(i)).
.. Id. at 4,661 (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. S 1648.4(b)).
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in writing and placed in the registrant's file." ' He may be accom-
panied by counsel, but only the registrant and witnesses are allowed
to testify."' The board then considers the merits of the claim utiliz-
ing the guidelines to analyze his religious training and belief, and
additional factors relevant to a determination of the registrant's
sincerity."' The changes in the new regulations reflect an attempt
to streamline the classification process by reducing the amount
of paperwork required. The effect, however, is to shift the burden
of providing information completely to the claimant. The sufficiency
of his claim under the revised system depends not only upon the
answers he may provide, but more importantly it assumes that
he will know all the necessary questions.
Appeal to a district appeal board may be made by the registrant
upon a denial of his claim for classification." 5 The registrant must
file a written notice of appeal and may request a personal
appearance.' He also may submit a written statement specifying
the reasons for taking such an appeal. 17 If the district board renders
an adverse classification, the claimant may petition the President
1.2 Id. at 4,661-62 (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. S 1648.5(d)). The use of cameras or recording
devices and the transcription of verbatim testimony is prohibited. See id. at 4,662 (to be
codified at 32 C.F.R. S 1648.5(h)).
113 Id. at 4,662 (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. S 1648.5(f)).
114 Id. at 4,656-57 (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. SS 1636.5-8). Two provisions are conspicuously
absent in the revised regulations. First, no longer may the Board determine that a prima
facie claim has been established. See 32 C.F.R. S 1661.8 (1981), amended by 47 Fed. Reg.
4,640 (1982). Furthermore, no provision has been made for the submission of standardized
forms for conscientious objection claims. This is consistent with the trend of the Selective
Service System to reduce the amount of information required in filing claims. Originally,
after registration a person had to file an eight-page Classification Questionnaire [SSS Form
1001 (see A. TATUM & J. TUCHINSKY, GUIDE TO THE DRAFT 30-45 (1969) for a reproduction of
Form 100). Form 100 was revised in March, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 5,121 (1972), but that shorter
Registration Questionnaire was revoked in December, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 25,715 (1972). After
the revocation of Form 100, a conscientious objector would file a two-page Current Infor-
mation Questionnaire [SSS Form 127]. On this form he would indicate that he claimed to
be a conscientious objector and the Selective Service System then would send the registrant
a Special Form for Conscientious Objector [SSS Form 150]. Form 150 was revised at least
three times, and on each occasion the amount of information to be submitted was reduced
substantially. (Copies of Forms 127 and 150 are reproduced in 2 SEL. SERV. L. REP. (PUB.
L. EDUC. INST.) 2156:11-12, 2156:13-14.3 (1973)).
15 Deferment or Exemption From Military Service, 47 Fed. Reg. 4,640, 4,662 (1982) (to
be codified at 32 C.F.R. S 1651.1). The Director of the Selective Service also may appeal
from any determination of a local board.
"' Id. at 4,662 (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. S 1651.3). The personal appearance is not man-
datory at this stage and the scope of review is limited. Only the registrant may appear
(accompanied by counsel), and only the information in his file and written evidence sub-
mitted to the local board is considered on appeal.
117 Id. at 4,662 (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. S 1651.4). Procedural errors will be returned
to the local 'board for correction. Failure to appear before the district appeal board does
not bar the appellant's claim. Classification will be based upon the material in his file.
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of the United States and request a personal appearance before
the National Selective Service Appeal Board."' A written notice
of appeal is filed with the local board. The restrictions and con-
siderations upon review by the national board correspond with
those of the district appeal board."9 The decision of the President
appears to be final. There is no provision for subsequent judicial
review unless the registrant refuses to submit to induction and
is charged with a violation of the Military Selective Service Act.'20
4. Alternative Service
The regulations for alternative service in lieu of induction are
administered by the Selective Service System. ' Only those in-
dividuals who have been classified as conscientious objectors
available for alternative service may "volunteer" for alternative
service. This provision allows the conscientious objector to sug-
gest suitable jobs in which he may be skilled.2 ' The failure to
volunteer or the disapproval of the proposed jobs results in an
assignment of a specific job by the State Director.'23
Only those positions in which the employer is either the federal
or state government or a nonprofit organization may be considered
appropriate for alternative service. Also, the nonprofit organiza-
tion must serve the general public in some charitable activity or
contribute to the improvement of the public health or welfare
through its programs. 4 The Selective Service System identifies
five elements that a State Director will be required to consider
... Id. at 4,663 (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. 5 1653.1).
"' Id. at 4,663-64 (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. S 1653.3). Proceedings before the national
appeal board are closed to the public.
See also Conscientious Objectors, 32 C.F.R. SS 75, 730, 888e (1981) (procedures for disposi-
tion of conscientious objectors from the specific branches of the Armed Forces).
10 50 U.S.C. app. SS 451-471a (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
1"1 Alternate Service, 32 C.F.R. S 1660 (1981). But see infra notes 196-201, 227 and accom-
panying text for the German and Brazilian treatment of alternative service.
' Alternate Service, 32 C.F.R. at S 1660.3 The use of the term "volunteer" in this
section is misleading in as much as the conscientious objector is being compelled to serve
in lieu of induction. However, this approach would utilize the skills and training of each
objector, and would maximize the benefits available to the nation under such a system.
See also 1981 Statement by Friends World Committee for Consultation, supra note 30.
That statement submitted by the Friends World Committee for Consultation (Quakers)
suggested various forms of alternate service: ambulance units in war zones; social services
in areas of need; hospital service in regions with a shortage of para-medical personnel;
educational service; and international service for peace and development. Id. at 2.
"2 Alternate Service, 32 C.F.R. at S 1660.4. The registrant still is allowed to amend the
order to report to alternate service, by submitting an alternative proposal for employment.
"24 Id. at S 1660.5. These programs may include educational and scientific activities in
support of the public health or welfare.
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in ruling upon job proposals. The job must serve the nation's health,
safety or welfare.125 The competitive labor market cannot be in-
terfered with by assigning conscientious objectors to positions
already filled by qualified applicants."2 Compensation may not ex-
ceed the standard of living that would have been received in
military service."' The proposed job should utilize a registrant's
special skills.128 Finally, only in extreme circumstances will a
registrant be allowed to work within his community." These pro-
visions are designed to insure that there is equitable treatment
between military personnel and alternative servicemen.
A conscientious objector is required to complete twenty-four
months of alternative service before his release can be secured. 3 '
This period is identical to the length of service required of an in-
ductee in the Armed Forces."' Under the alternative service regula-
tions, failure to perform alternative service to the satisfaction of
one's employer is sufficient to find an intentional violation of the
Selective Service Act.32 The flexible nature of these regulations
assumes that in a time of induction there will exist an increasing
demand for employees as men are compelled to serve in the
military. While this may be a valid assumption, the regulations
do not specify the manner in which the Selective Service is to iden-
tify that demand. This deficiency is addressed in a proposal to revise
the Selective Service alternative service program."3
The Alternative Service Concept Paper proposes that the Selec-
tive Service System cooperate with other federal agencies, for
example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Depart-
ment of Labor, Office of Personnel Management, and state and
local government agencies, to identify and fill work force shortages
in civilian areas."3 Not only would specific job openings be iden-
12 Id. at S 1660.6(a)(1).
Id. at S 1660.6(a)(2).
127 Id. at S 1660.6(a)(3).
125 Id. at S 1660.6(a)(4).
12 Id. at 5 1660.6(a)(5). These last three elements can be waived at the discretion of the
State Director.
Id. at S 1660.10.
50 U.S.C. app. S 454(b) (1976).
13 32 C.F.R. S 1660.8 (1981).
Proposed Concept of Alternative Service, 46 Fed. Reg. 6,998 (1981) (to be codified
at 32 C.F.R. pt. 1660) (proposed Jan. 22, 1981). A final set of regulations is expected to
be released no later than May 24, 1982. See Notes of telephone interview with Paul Knapp,
Attorney with the Policy Development Department of the Selective Service Administra-
tion (Feb. 24, 1982) (available in Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law
Offices).
'3 Id. at 6,999.
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tified, but a system of priorities would be established for place-
ment purposes. Maximization of the program would be attempted
by placement of conscientious objectors according to their
abilities." A data bank would be established containing individual
aptitude and skill profiles and available alternative service
positions."6
The success of this proposal is enhanced by its approach from
a national perspective. The present systems operates, in effect,
as fifty separate units. The proposed system would coordinate
resources available from various governmental agencies, and would
be open to suggestions from nongovernmental organizations in-
terested in conscientious objection and alternative service as well
as input from employers who would participate in the program.137
The Selective Service Administration recognizes that there must
be some incentives for employers to participate, and suggests that
the federal government subsidize the program through a system
of tax incentives or employee stipends.1'
5. Status of the Conscientious Objector
The decision of the conscientious objector to claim exemption
from military service carries unforeseen costs apart from the ex-
penditures incurred in pursuing the claim. For purposes of
Veteran's Administration (V.A.) benefits, the conscientious objec-
tor is barred specifically from any entitlement under a V.A.
program."' The conscientious objector, by reason of his belief,
forfeits all rights to both the National Service Life Insurance'
and the Serviceman's Group Life Insurance programs."' Under those
forfeiture provisions, the objector is placed in the same category
as persons guilty of mutiny, treason, spying, or desertion. The only
exception to this penalization of conscientious objection exists for
those objectors who served the military in noncombatant roles.
"u Id. at 7,000.
I /d.
" Id. at 7,002.
"' Id. at 6,999.
38 U.S.C. S 3103(a) (1976). "[Tlhe discharge of any such person on the ground that
he was a conscientious objector ... shall bar all rights of such person under laws administered
by the Veteran's Administration." Id. But see infra notes 218-25 and accompanying text
for the deprivation of benefits and political rights imposed upon Brazilian citizens.
' 38 U.S.C. S 711 (1976). "Any person found guilty of mutiny, treason, spying or deser-
tion, or who, because of conscientious objections, refuses to perform service in the Armed
Forces . . . shall forfeit all rights to National Service Life Insurance." Id
"' 38 U.S.C. S 773 (1976).
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The Veteran's Readjustment Act of 1966142 allows that category
of conscientious objectors to be eligible for educational benefits;
those who performed alternative service in the civilian commun-
ity are not eligible. The justification for this discrimination has
been that "[s]ince Congress is not Constitutionally required to carve
out an exception for conscientious objectors . . . Congress 'owed'
CO alternative servers nothing in the way of extra benefits. '4
It is argued that alternative service is more disruptive than
military service, and therefore the conscientious objector should
be able to participate in these programs.'" For example, dependents
of alternative servicemen are not entitled to receive benefits that
are otherwise available to families of military personnel. Unlike
military service veterans, alternative servicemen receive no re-
employment guarantees. Moreover, the level of training received
by alternative servicemen generally is not comparable to the skills
developed by military personnel.145 The ability of the veteran to
find employment upon completion of his tour of duty, military or
civilian, depends in large part upon the skills he developed while
serving. This differential treatment perpetuates the hardships the
conscientious objector and his family must endure, beyond his re-
quired period of alternative service.
An objector is faced with two options when he either fails to
comply with the proper procedures for obtaining the conscientious
objector exemption or is denied such status by the local board or
military review board. He may decide to violate the Selective Ser-
1 2 38 U.S.C. S 1651-86 (1976).
1" Zweig, Military Law: Educational Benefits for Conscientious Objectors Performing Alter-
native Service, 1976 ANN. Sunv. AM. L. 698, 703 (1976). See also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S.
361 (1974), rev'g, 352 F. Supp. 848 (D. Mass. 1973). The Supreme Court held that the Veteran's
Readjustment Act denial of educational benefits to conscientious objectors who performed
alternative service was not unconstitutional. The respondent's claim that the statute violated
the free exercise of religion clause in the first amendment was rejected. 415 U.S. at 366, 383.
An alien or noncitizen national of the United States who is exempted from military ser-
vice by reason of conscientious objection also is penalized for his beliefs. Such an individual
is not entitled to forego the general residency requirement of five years for naturalization
purposes. See 8 U.S.C. S 1427(a) (1976). On the other hand, those who served honorably
on active duty status may be naturalized regardless of their period of residence. 8 U.S.C.
S 1440(a) (1976).
This is not to intimate that an alien or noncitizen national who is a conscientious objec-
tor will be barred from becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen. Such an individual is allowed
to refuse to bear arms on behalf of the United States provided that he agrees to perform
noncombatant military service or work of national importance under civilian direction. The
opposition to bear arms must be by reason of religious training and belief. 8 U.S.C. S 1448(a)
(1976).




vice Act by failing to register, by refusing to submit to induction,
or by refusing to comply with an assignment of alternative
service."' However, the objector who submits to induction is sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the courts-martial.' A decision to violate
the Code of Military Justice"4 8 may expose the unrecognized con-
scientious objector to dishonorable discharge, imprisonment, death,
or any other punishment directed by a court-martial."9 It was the
threat of this type of prosecution that caused draft evaders and
deserters to seek asylum in foreign countries as a last resort. '
6. The Questions of Asylum and Extradition for Unrecognized
Conscientious Objectors
The question of asylum under international law is governed by
national legislation and regulations that implement specific obliga-
tions imposed by international treaties and agreements. At the
very least, the so-called right of asylum is nothing but the right
of a State to grant asylum to an alien, that is, "to allow a pros-
ecuted alien to enter, and to remain on, its territory under its pro-
tection. . . ."I", Implicit in this qualified right is the discretionary
latitude with which a nation might grant territorial asylum, tak-
ing into account various foreign policy considerations. Under the
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the right
to asylum is qualified similarly: "Everyone has the right to seek
and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." (emphasis
added).'52 Article 14 does not confer a right to receive asylum,
'" 50 U.S.C. app. S 462 (1976).
147 Id.
10 U.S.C. SS 801-950 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
Only the offenses of desertion or attempt to desert and willful disobedience of an
order of a superior officer, during a time of war, are punishable by death. A court-martial
may direct any other punishment for offenses including desertion and disobedience of an
order of an officer not in time of war, absence without leave, missing movement of one's
,unit, and failure to obey any other order or regulation. See 10 U.S.C. SS 885-92 (1976). Any
person who advises or urges a refusal of duty by any member of the Armed Forces
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. (Dur-
ing time of war the penalty is increased to 20 years imprisonment.) One who harbors a
person who committed this offense also is subject to the $10,000 fine and 10 year imprison-
ment penalty. 18 U.S.C. SS 2387, 2388 (1976).
"5 The treatment of amnesty for draft evaders, veterans with less than honorable or
dishonorable discharges, and deserters is beyond the scope of this Note. The exercise of
the President's power to pardon after the Vietnam conflict is analyzed in Hansell, Am-
nesty, Discharge Status Upgrading and Military Deserters Under the Carter Administra-
tion: Selective Redemption, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 344 (1977). See also Greenawalt, Vietnam
Amnesty: Problems of Justice and Line Drawing, 11 GA. L. REV. 1 (1976).
,' 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW S 316, at 678 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 14, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948). Article 14,
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however,1 ' and there is no obligation imposed upon a petitioned
nation to grant such a request.
An obligation is imposed under the more expansive, yet not ab-
solute, provisions of the Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees.15' Article 33 of the Protocol prohibits the expulsion or
return of a refugee seeking asylum. It requires that: "No contrac-
ting State shall expell or return ('refouler') a refugee in any man-
ner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, na-
tionality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion." l"' As one author has noted, article 33 established a right
not to be returned, rather than any affirmative right to remain
under the protection of the petitioned country. Only when a refugee
is able to secure the protection of a third country against his return
to a persecuting country may the petitioned country refuse to grant
asylum. 15'
The General Assembly also has adopted a Declaration on Ter-
ritorial Asylum, which expounds certain general principles to be
adopted by member nations that are consistent with the right to
seek asylum under article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.15 The recommendations of the General Assembly were in-
tended to achieve mutual recognition and support of nations that
granted asylum. In an attempt to further this goal of cooperation,
the United Nations convened a conference on territorial asylum
in 1977, which was not able to complete a final draft convention."
S 2 provides that: "This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely
arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of
the United Nations." This section identifies the scope of the right to seek asylum and essen-
tially limits it to political persecution.
153 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 151, at 677-78.
1I Opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S.
268 [hereinafter cited as Protocol].
1" Id. at art. 33, S 1. Section 2 protects the requested country by denying the benefits,
under S 1 when there are reasonable grounds for regarding a refugee as a danger to the
security of the requested country or when the refugee has been convicted of a particularly
serious crime. Id. at S 2.
For the purposes of the Protocol the term "refugee" applies to any person who: "owing
to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his national-
ity and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country .... " Id. at art. 1 A(2).
Note. The Right of Asylum under United States Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1125,1126 (1980).
'5 G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967).
' U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 78/12 (1977). The Conference failed to complete its work in draft-
ing a final convention. The General Assembly since has ignored the request in the Con-
ference Report that a further session be convened to complete the work of the Conference.
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It was within this context of international asylum that United
States draft evaders and deserters of the Vietnam conflict sought
refuge overseas. Estimates of the number of Vietnam era draft
evaders in Canada ranged from Selective Service statistics of 1,500
to media reports as high as 70,000.19 The number of deserters under
some political motivation was much more conservative: 749 were
absent from military duty without authorization in foreign
countries.11 This number is especially deceptive when compared
to the total number of desertions in the United States Armed
Forces during 1967 and 1968. The Department of Defense reported
that there were 93,584 unauthorized military absences that ex-
ceeded 30 days in length."' On the other hand, there were only
693 total convictions for desertion from the Armed Forces between
1964 and December of 1967.1" Instead, many of the deserters were
punished for the lesser offense of Absent Without Leave (AWOL).'
"' Jones & Raish, American Deserters and Draft Evaders: Exile, Punishment or Amnesty?
13 HARV. INT'L L. J. 88,88 n. 2 (1972). As of December 31, 1968 the Selective Service reported
that 2,101 individuals remained under indictment for violations of the Selective Service
Act; of this number, one-third were estimated as fugitives from the country. See SUBCOMM.
ON TREATMENT OF DESERTERS FROM MILITARY SERVICE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON ARMED SER.
VICES, TREATMENT OF DESERTERS FROM MILITARY SERVICE, S. REP. No. 93,91st Cong., 1st Sess.
27-29 (1969) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 931. It was not noted whether this number
represented violations including failure to register, or only violations for refusal to submit
to induction after registration. Conceivably, the number of draft evaders was much higher
when those who fled the country before registration are counted.
" This number covered the time period from July 1, 1966 through January 21, 1969.
Of the 749, 170 had been returned to U.S. jurisdiction. Sweden alone accounted for at least
174 known deserters. S. REP. No. 93, supra note 159, at 7, 10.
Another account reported that as many as one-third of the deserters in foreign coun-
tries were aliens returning to their original countries. In May, 1968, the greatest number
of U.S. citizens known to have deserted was in Canada. Sweden ranked second in deserters,
followed by France. Military Deserters: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Armed Services, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 6 (1968) (statement of Alfred Fitt, Asst. Sec.
of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
"I1 S. REP. No. 93, supra note 159, at 24. This was in spite of extensive programs that
were designed to deter desertion by holding frequent indoctrination sessions. See Hear-
ings, supra note 160, at 7-8.
16' Hearings, supra note 160, at 11. This approach was consistent with a general trend
of leniency that developed after World War II. The number of absentees tried and con-
victed of desertion actually decreased after World War II and Korea. Id. at 66.
This finding of lenient treatment led the Subcommittee on the Treatment of Deserters
from Military Service to recommend the abandonment of the overemphasis on leniency
extended to deserters. It was the position of the Subcommittee that the seriousness of
the problem of desertion was directly related to this lenient treatment. Such leniency was
characterized as a "miscarriage of justice." S. REP. No. 93, supra note 159, at 31-33.
I" S. REP. No. 93, supra note 159, at 31. Absence without leave for more than 30 days is
punishable by dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine-
ment at hard labor not to exceed one year. Id. at 6. The punishment for desertion (under
which an intent to remain away permanently must be proven) is dishonorable discharge,
forfeiture, and confinement not to exceed five years. Id. at 5.
A A----
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These serious rates of desertion and draft evasion may be at-
tributed in part to the problems of leniency, failure to prevent
the exodus of objectors, and inadequate personnel accounting.
However, it would have been nearly impossible for deserters and
evaders to abandon their obligation of military service without the
receptive asylum policies of Canada, Sweden, and France.164
Although Canada did not offer formal asylum to United States
draft evaders and deserters, emigration across the northern border
was attractive because Canadian laws did not exclude a noncitizen
due to draft evasion or desertion. Canada had no draft, and the
United States-Canadian extradition treaties did not include draft
evasion or desertion as extraditable offenses. s
During the Vietnam conflict, Swedish governmental authorities
refused requests of the United States Government for informa-
tion that would have led to the return of deserters1 66 to United
States control.
The Swedish authorities made it quite clear that in their eyes
and in accordance with their traditions as a neutral country and
a place of asylum for people from various countries, there was
no point in discussing the matter of returning these people to the
United States or to U.S. control, and indeed as a general matter
their position was that this is a matter entirely for decision and
determination by Swedish authorities.1"7
This disparate treatment led the Chairman of the Subcommittee, Sen. Inouye to remark
that "instead of burning draft cards [5 year sentence imposed], the easiest way to get out
of service would be to volunteer, desert, make a few statements, then arrange through
some third party to return and get 4 months' hard labor and go free, and never be drafted
again." Hearings, supra note 160, at 26.
", The continued presence of U.S. deserters in Canada, Sweden and France during the
Vietnam conflict depended upon the internal laws and foreign policy positions of the respec-
tive country. See Hearings, supra note 160, at 49.
11 See A. TATUM & J. TUCHINSKY, supra note 114, at 237-45. "It [was] the announced policy
of Canada not to discriminate against deserters or evaders seeking refuge in Canada."
Jones & Raish, supra note 159, at 90-91.
The deserter or draft evader normally would seek "landed immigrant status" under the
Canadian Immigration Act, Can. Rev. Stat. ch. 1-2 S 32(4) (1970), and the Immigration Regula-
tions, Part I, as amended, Can. Stat. 0. & Regs. No. 67-434 (1967). While these provisions
have been repealed subsequently, the provisions replacing them are essentially identical
with respect to qualifications for landed immigrant status. See Immigration Act, 1976, Can.
Stat. ch. 52, S 128 (1976-77); Immigration Regulations, 9 Consol. Regs. Can. ch. 940, S 42,
ch. 940 sch. 1 (1978). See also Jones & Raish, supra note 159, at 90-96 (containing a detailed
recital of Canadian and Swedish immigration laws as they applied to U.S. draft evaders
and deserters).
1' Generally, deserters entered Sweden after leaving their posts in Europe. On the other
hand, the number of draft evaders in Sweden was probably small, due to the distance of
that country from the United States. See Jones & Raish, supra note 159, at 94.
167 Hearings, supra note 160, at 42 (testimony of Frederick Smith, Deputy Adm'r, Bureau
of Security and Consular Affairs, Dep't of State).
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The Swedish authorities were criticized for their policy of providing
asylum and financial assistance to deserters from the United States
Armed Forces. The financial assistance, amounting to nearly $120
per month for subsistence, food, and pocket money, was regarded
as an inducement for United States military personnel to desert.'"
On the other hand, the United States government was criticized
for its failure to make any adequate effort to secure the return
from foreign countries of deserters, and for its inconsistent treat-
ment of alien deserters with regard to the question of their ad-
missibility to the United States. 6'
The most immediate consequence of the decision to depart from
the United States to avoid military service is that the deserter
or draft evader is subject to arrest and almost certain conviction
under the selective service laws, should he attempt to return to
the United States.170 At one time, desertion and draft evasion were
sufficient grounds to result in a loss of nationality for the United
States citizen,"' but in 1958 the Supreme Court ruled that avoidance
of the burdens of citizenship was an insufficient ground to ex-
patriate a United States citizen and that the provisions of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act that attempted to expatriate the
deserter or draft evader were unconstitutional. '72 Congress subse-
quently repealed those provisions."' On the other hand, if the
military deserter or draft evader voluntarily renounces his United
States citizenship, he is categorized with other undesirable aliens
and is precluded from re-entdring the United States. 74
"I S. REP. No. 93, supra note 159, at 11-12. Under 18 U.S.C. SS 2387, 2388 (1976), such in-
ducement, if committed with the intent to interfere with U.S. military forces, would sub-
ject a person to criminal liability of a maximum $10,000 Tine and/or 20 years imprisonment.
"' The Subcommittee called for a renegotiation of U.S. extradition agreements to pro-
vide for the return of deserters and draft evaders. It specifically criticized the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service position that "desertion from the military forces of another
country, including conviction for desertion, would not be relevant to the question of an
alien's admissibility to the United States." S. REP. No. 93, supra note 159, at 12-13.
"' Note, Draft Resisters in Exile: Prospects and Risks of Return, 7 COLUM. J. L. & Soc.
PROBS. 1, 3 (1971). In 1969, the conviction rate for Selective Service prosecutions was 98.9%.
... Immigration and Nationality Act SS 349(a)(8), 349(aX10), 8 U.S.C. S 1481 (1976) (repealed
1978 and 1976 respectively). Expatriation resulted from acts of: (8) desertion from military
service in time of war, and (10) departing or remaining outside the United States for the
purpose of avoiding military service in time of war or national emergency.
72 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (expatriation of deserter constituted cruel and
unusual punishment); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (expatriation of
one who avoided military service constituted unconstitutional punishment because it was
not imposed subject to the protections of the fifth and sixth amendments).
"' Paragraph (8) of section 349(a) was repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-432, S 2, 92 Stat. 1046
(1978). Paragraph (10) was repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-412, S 501, 90 Stat. 1258 (1976).
... Immigration and Nationality Act S 212(a)(22), 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a)(22) (1976). It is essen-
tial that the resister renounce his citizenship prior to mailing his induction notice. Other-
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A citizen of the United States may lose his nationality by ob-
taining naturalization in a foreign country upon his own
application;175 or, he may take an oath or make an affirmative
declaration of allegiance to a foreign state,7 ' for example, for pur-
poses of employment or to complete the naturalization process.
Implied by these acts is an intention to renounce one's citizenship
voluntarily. Absent these circumstances, a United States citizen
has the constitutional right to remain a citizen unless he volun-
tarily relinquishes that citizenship.1 7 It is argued that the Viet-
nam draft evader who became a Canadian citizen may have been
a dual national, because Canadian naturalization does not require
renunciation of other citizenship in its oaths of allegiance."' For
draft evaders after Afroyim v. Rusk, the question of expatriation
depended upon a clear demonstration of an intent to expatriate
oneself when one accepted the burdens and benefits of foreign
citizenship.179
The citizenship status of a deserter may be critical to the ques-
tion of extradition of draft evaders by or to the United States.
Extradition exists in the United States only by the authority of
an enforceable extradition treaty between the United States and
a foreign country.' In the absence of a treaty, the United States
may not extradite, or seek the extradition of, a draft evader. Ex-
tradition of individuals is limited to those persons charged with
extraditable offenses, as designated specifically by a treaty to which
the United States is a party."' The conscientious objector who
deserts or evades the draft may not be extraditable simply because
wise, the resister will be unable to obtain reclassification as a nonresident alien; the com-
bined effect of the untimely renunciation will be to render the resister subject to arrest
upon any attempted return, and to leave him stateless.
175 Immigration and Nationality Act S 349(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. S 1481(a)(1) (1976).
176 Id. at S 349(a)(2).
177 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967). It was Attorney General Ramsey Clark's
position that Afroyim decided only that the United States cannot revoke one's citizenship
when a U.S. citizen votes in a foreign political election. As Afroyim failed to define the con-
duct that may be regarded as a voluntary relinquishment of citizenship, the Attorney General
appeared to adopt the view that the government is giving formal recognition (rather than
terminating citizenship) to the consequence of a citizen's voluntary relinquishment of his
citizenship. That relinquishment may be implied by his actions in taking an oath of allegiance
or securing citizenship in another country. See Expatriation: Effect of Afroyim v. Rusk,
387 U.S. 253, 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 397 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 42 Op. Att'y Gen.].
17 Dellapenna, The Citizenship of Draft Evaders after the Pardon, 22 VILL. L. REV. 531,
548 (1977). This position is at odds with the Attorney General's opinion, supra note 177,
at 399-400.
179 42 Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 177, at 400.
,s 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 734 (1968).
, Id. at 772.
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desertion or draft evasion is not enumerated in the particular
treaty. Many extradition treaties prohibit extradition when the
offense is a military crime."
The deserter or draft evader also may be exempt from extradi-
tion if he has become a national of the requested state."' 5 A re-
quest by the United States for the extradition of a dual national
has been denied, and absent a specific provision in an extradition
treaty, extradition is prohibited when an individual has acquired
the nationality of the country granting asylum after the commis-
sion of the offense.'" Even if the deserter or draft evader chooses
not to become naturalized, the requested state may grant political
asylum to the conscientious objector and refuse the United States
request to extradite.185
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A. A Comparison Involving the West German, Yugoslav, and
Brazilian Approaches to Conscientious Objection
The development of international standards for conscientious ob-
jection to military service requires more than an extensive analysis
of United States law on the subject. The recent revision of the
Selective Service Regulations is one indication that the system
for processing exemptions to military service is still imperfect in
the United States. A brief survey of three divergent approaches
to the recognition of conscientious objection follows. The purpose
" Id. at 858. See Convention on Extradition, Oct. 24, 1961, United States-Sweden, art.
V, para. 4, 14 U.S.T. 1845, T.I.A.S. No. 5496. Article V provides that extradition shall not
be granted for a purely military offense. Id. at 1849.
183 6 M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 180, at 865-See Convention on Extradition, Oct. 24, 1961,
United States-Sweden, art. VII, 14 U.S.T. 1845, T.I.A.S. No. 5496. Article VII states that
"[there is no obligation upon the requested State to grant the extradition of a person
who is a national of the requested State," but also provides that the executive has the
discretionary authority to do so. Id. at 1849.
184 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 180, at 867-69. In 1959, the US. refused to extradite an in-
dividual who recently had become a U.S. citizen, even though extradition had been sought
four years prior to the acquisition of his new citizenship. Id. at 869.
However, there may be an exception to this general rule of law. As between the United
States, Great Britain, and Canada. if a treaty refers only to persons and makes no mention
of nationality, the presumption is that nationals of the requested country may be extradited.
Id. at 871.
.8 There are numerous reasons for the foreign country to refuse the U.S. request of
extradition. One primary motivating factor may be the need for highly educated and/or
skilled people in the foreign country. For example, the Canadian government during the
Vietnam conflict readily granted landed immigrant status to the college educated or highly
trained individual. (The "landed immigrant" status is analagous to the U.S. "lawfully ad-
mitted alien" status.) See A. TATUM & J. TUCHINSKY, supra note 114, at 237-45.
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of this comparative analysis is to present an overview of the various
potential facets of an exemption based upon conscience, and to
create a continuum along which a model approach to the treat-
ment of conscientious objection may be placed.
1. Federal Republic of Germany
In West Germany, conscientious objection is an explicit constitu-
tional right guaranteed under the Basic Law of the Federal Republic
of Germany.18 Article 4(3) provides that: "No one may be compelled
against his conscience to render war service involving the use of
arms. Details shall be regulated by a federal law."' 87 The right of
conscientious objection is regulated by the procedures prescribed
in the Conscription Act, 8' which permits any person subject to
military service to apply at any time for formal recognition as a
conscientious objector.'89 This application process is more liberal
than the United States procedures, which generally restrict the
ability of military personnel to claim post-induction conscientious
objector status. The decision on the West German objector's ap-
plication is made by a special examination committee for conscien-
tious objection (Pruefungsausschuss fuer Kriegsdienstver-
weigerer),' 9' and the committee is required to take into account
11 GRUNDGESETZ FUER DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] art. 4(3) (W. Ger. 1949) (G.
Flanz trans. 1974).
Other countries that recognize conscientious objection as a constitutional right include:
Portugal, the Netherlands (proposed), and Suriname. 1980 Report, supra note 28, at 8, Add.
2 at 4, Add. 6 at 3.
... GG art. 4(3). The Basic Law may require that all other men at least eighteen years
of age serve in the Armed Forces, in the Federal Border Guard, or in a Civil Defense
organization. Id. at art. 12a(1). (The conditional tense of this subsection is interpreted as
allowing for the possibility of enactment of national legislation requiring conscription.)
18, Wehrpflichtgesetz, 1962 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] I 349 (W. Ger.). The Conscription
Act was amended by an act allowing for simple written notification to an Examination
Committee that an individual claimed conscientious objector recognition. 1977 BGB1 I 2021.
That amendment was repealed (1977 BGBI I 1229), after the amendment was found un-
constitutional by the highest constitutional court. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 1977
BGBI I 2623 (W. Ger.)
'" But see 1962 BGB1 I 349 S 26(3). In order to receive an exemption from military ser-
vice, the conscientious objector must submit his application two weeks before his induc-
tion examination. The application itself does not do away with the duty to report for registra-
tion purposes nor to appear at the induction examination. However, an applicant cannot
be required to report for military service before the matter has been resolved completely.
Only if the Examination Board or the Administrative Court has rejected the application,
may the individual be compelled to perform military service. See 1980 Report, Add. 1, supra
note 28, at 7. Note however, that S 26(3) does not prohibit an individual from seeking recogni-
tion of conscientious objector status after his induction.
' 1962 BGBI I 349 S 26(3). This committee is analogous to the U.S. Selective Service
System's local draft board.
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the complete personality of the applicant as well as his moral con-
duct when making its decision.'91 It is important to note that
members of the committee have extensive discretion, and are not
subject to any directions or regulations in reviewing an applica-
tion. This lack of regulatory guidelines is in direct contrast to the
extensive provisions that bind the local draft boards in the United
States.19 At the same time, a West German applicant's legal rights
are protected under the Conscription Act, which provides that he
may receive the benefit of counsel 9 3 and requires that the appli-
cant be advised of the proper process for the appeal of an adverse
decision."M Generally, the United States and West German appellate
practices are quite similar. The rejection of a West German's ap-
plication for conscientious objector recognition is challenged initially
before an examination board. Legal action then may be instituted
before an Administrative Court and subsequently appealed to a
Federal Administrative Court. If the application is rejected still,
a conscientious objector may file a complaint with the Federal Con-
stitutional Court claiming that his fundamental right of conscien-
tious objection to military service has been denied. '
A person who receives formal recognition as a conscientious ob-
jector may not, under any circumstances, be compelled to render
military service, even in a time of peace. 96 The conscientious ob-
jector may be drafted, however, into non-combatant military ser-
" 1962 BGBI I 349 S 26(4). The applicant does not have to prove any specific conditions
to receive recognition as a conscientious objector.
1962 BGBI I 349 S 26(8. Such persons are designated by churches, religious corn-
of 32 C.F.R.). The only exception to this exercise of discretion is that the examination com-
mittee for conscientious objection will be bound by the decisions of the administrative and
constitutional courts on matters of conscientious objection, and will be required to deter-
mine the validity of an application in accordance with those decisions.
93 1962 BGB1 1 349 S 26(8). Such persons are designated by churches, religious com-
mitees, and corporate bodies of public law, and they receive no compensation for their
services.
1 Id. at S 26(6).
195 1980 Report, Add. 1, supra note 28, at 7. The extent of this fundamental constitu-
tional right has not been tested in the context of selective conscientious objection to a
particular war, as it has been tested in the U.S. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying
text; Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). The reason selective conscientious ob-
jection remains unchallenged in West Germany is that West Germany has not found itself
at war with any country since its constitution was adopted in 1949. The question of selec-
tive conscientious objection is quite viable in that country, given the present division of
Germany into East and West. In the event of a conflict in which East may be pitted against
West, the refusal of many Germans to fight against "fellow" Germans is foreseeable. See
Council of Europe Report, supra note 39, at 7.
'" 1980 Report, Add. 1, supra note 28, at 7.
In Finland, conscientious objectors are required to bear arms in time of war. Id. at 6.
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vice, provided that he applies for such service.'97 If not, a conscien-
tious objector will be required constitutionally to complete a period
of alternative civilian service, 9 as regulated by the Civilian Ser-
vice Act for Conscientious Objectors." Generally, the alternative
service must be completed with a civilian agency and it must be
for the general public welfare. 00 The period of alternative service
in West Germany is equal to the length of compulsory military
service."0
2. Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
In the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia conscientious ob-
jection to military service is not recognized as a constitutional right
as it is in West Germany, nor as a privilege granted by the
legislature or executive as it is in the United States. Consistent
with the ideology of a socialist political system, the Yugoslav
Constitution 02 establishes the "inviolable and inalienable right and
duty"' of its citizens to protect and defend the independence and
1 7 1962 BGBI I 349 S 25. Non-combatant military service exempts a conscientious objec-
tor from the duty of armed combat and the requirement that he participate in a training
program that prepares an inductee for armed military service. Id. at 5 27.
In Italy, a conscientious objector may elect to serve the military in an unarmed capacity.
Only one person has made this election. 1980 Report, Add. 3, supra note 28, at 3.
19 GG art. 12a (2-6), amended by 1968 BGB1 I 710.
A person who refuses, on grounds of conscience, to render war service involv-
ing the use of arms may be required to render a substitute service. The duration
of such substitute service shall not exceed the duration of military service. Details
shall be regulated by a law which shall not interfere with the freedom of con-
science and must also provide for the possibility of a substitute service not con-
nected with units of the Armed Forces or of the Federal Border Guard.
Id. at art. 12a(2).
1" Gesetz ueber den Zivildienst der Kriegdienstverweigerer, 1960 BGB I 10; amended
by 1977 BGBI 1 1229; declared unconstitutional by BVerfG, 1977 BGB1 I 2623 (the effect
of his holding was to repeal the 1977 Amendment and revive the 1960 Act as originally
enacted).
' 1980 Report, Add. 1, supra note 28, at 7. Social work has priority over other forms
of civilian service.
"1 Id. At the time the 1980 Report was compiled, the average length of compulsory military
service or alternative civilian service in West Germany was 16 months.
A unique approach to civilian service during a state of military defense exists in West
Germany. Under the Constitution, if "civilian service requirements in the civilian public
health and medical system or in the stationary military hospital organization cannot be
met on a voluntary basis, women between eighteen and fifty-five years of age may be
assigned to such services by or pursuant to a law." GG art. 12a(4).
In Denmark, the Netherlands, and Italy, the length of alternative service exceeds the
length of military service. 1980 Report, supra note 28, Add. 1 at 6, Add. 2 at 3, Add. 3 at 3.
' USTAV SOCIJALISTICKE FEDERATIVNE REPUBLIKE JUGOSLAVIJE [hereinafter cited as USTAV
JUGOSLAVIJE] (Constitution) (Yugo. 1974) (G. Flanz trans. 1979).
' Id. at art. 237. "It shall be the inviolable and inalienable right and duty of the nations
and nationalities of Yugoslavia, working people and citizens to protect and defend the in-
[Vol. 12:359
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social system of Yugoslavia. Compulsory military service is the
duty of all citizens," and is regulated by the Compulsory Military
Service Act. 5 That Act is effective in peacetime as well as in war,
and provides for the training and organization of all Yugoslav
citizens who are able to work.26
The Constitution also guarantees the equality of all citizens'
rights and duties regardless of nationality, race, sex, language,
religion, education or social status.2 This guarantee precludes the
utilization of one's religious beliefs to an advantage over a fellow
citizen; the logical inference of such position being that the obliga-
tion of military service cannot be avoided, regardless of an in-
dividual's religious or conscientious convictions. Furthermore, the
refusal to fulfill any aspect of one's military service obligation is
considered a violation of the Yugoslav Criminal Code,' and the
assertion of religious of conscientious objection as a defense is not
recognized. For example, draft evasion,' desertion, 21 and the refusal
dependence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the social system of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia [S.F.R.Y.] established by the S.F.R.Y. Constitution." Id.
The same approach to the duty of the citizenry is adopted in Panama, Syrian Arab
Republic. Equatorial Guinea, and Iran. In fact, in Iran it is a religious duty, and theoretic-
aly an objection based upon religious belief is impossible in that country. 1980 Report, supra
note 28, at 7, 8, Add. 2 at 2, Add. 3 at 2.
' USTAV JUGOSLAVIJE art. 241. In fact, the act of a person attempting to prevent citizens
of the S.F.R.Y. from repelling enemy attack is unconstitutional and punishable as high
treason. Id. at art. 238.
O bavezne Vojne Sluzbe Odluke, Yugoslavia, OFFICIAL GAZETTE (Sluvbeni List), 1980,
no. 36.
' 1980 Report, Add. 2, supra note 28, at 5. This system is quite similar in theory to
the proposal made by U.S. President Carter in 1980. See supra note 105 and accompanying
text.
The organization of the Yugoslav armed forces is uniquely decentralized, due to the
autonomous nature of the several nationalities in Yugoslavia. Each commune, autonomous
province, socio-political community, and Republic is required to organize a system of ter-
ritorial and civil defense in addition to the coordination of a system of national defense.
The responsibility for providing military equipment and supplies rests with the self-managing
organizations, local communities and labor organizations. See USTAV JUGOSLAVIJE art. 239;
THE YUGOSLAV CONCEPT OF GENERAL PEOPLE'S DEFENSE 318-21 (0. Mladenovic ed. 1970).
USTAV JUGOSLAVIJE art. 154.
KRIVICNI YAKONIK (Criminal Code) (Yugo.) (B. Blagojevic trans. 1964).
Evasion of a summons to military service, KRIVICNI YAKONIK art. 339. This article lists
three degrees of the offense of draft evasion. The first category includes failure to
"report for military conscription, doing of the compulsory military service, military train-
ing or any other military duty," which is punishable by fine or imprisonment not to exceed
one year. The second category applies to one who hides in order to evade a military obliga-
tion, and this offense is punishable by imprisonment of not less than three months nor
more than five years. The most severe category of draft evasion applies to one who leaves
the country with the intent to avoid his military obligation; this violation carries a ten
year maximum prison sentence.
210 Arbitrary abandonment and desertion of the army, KRVICNI YAKONIK art. 342. This
article enumerates four categories of desertion: absent without leave; abandonment and
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to bear arms"' are specifically enumerated criminal offenses against
the Armed Forces.' Finally, although the Compulsory Military
Service Act requires that a system of civil defense be organized,
apparently no provision exists to allow the election of alternative
civilian service.
3. Federal Republic of Brazil
An alternative and distinct approach to the question of con-
scientious objection is reflected in Brazilian legislation. Under the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil,13 the freedom of
conscience is guaranteed specifically, ' and an individual's rights
are protected from deprivation regardless of expression or exer-
cise of religious, political or philosophical beliefs and convictions. '
Although this appears consistent with both the West German and
United States approaches, one factor separates Brazil from other
nations that recognize the right or privilege of conscientious ob-
jection. The distinguishing characteristic of the Brazilian constitu-
tional guarantee of conscientious expression is contained in its
disclaimer or disqualification clause. An individual's rights shall
not be denied, "unless he invokes it [religious, political or phil-
osophical conviction] to exempt himself from a legal obligation
required of all, for which case the law may establish loss of the
rights incompatible with conscientious excusal [refusal]." ' This
single clause opens a pandora's box for the Brazilian citizen who
is compelled to object to military service.
seclusion (concealment) with the intent to avoid military service; desertion and escape abroad;
and inducement of desertion. The respective penalties for these offenses are imprisonment
for: not more than one year; not more than eight years; not more than twelve years; and
a period equal to the punishment for the nature of the desertion induced.
2'1 Refusal to receive or use arms, KRIVICNI YAKONIK art. 327a. This offense is punishable
by imprisonment not to exceed ten years.
212 Criminal Offenses Against the Armed Forces, KRIVICNI YAKONIK ch. 25, arts. 327-62.
There are 39 separate offenses specified in this chapter. Note that if an individual commits
an offense of draft evasion, desertion, or the refusal to bear arms (plus other offenses),
in a time of war, the penalty is increased to imprisonment of not less than five years,
or the death penalty may be imposed. Id. at 360a.
213 CONSTITUICAO DA REPUBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL [hereinafter cited as CONST. DO
BRASIL] (Braz. 1967, amended 1969) (Organization of American States trans. 1975).
214 CONST. DO BRASIL art. 153, para. 5.
.15 CONST. DO BRASIL art. 153, para. 6.
216 Id. It is interesting to note that the Brazilian authorities do not consider conscien-
tious objection to military service a crime. However, the exercise of the "right" of con-
scientious objection penalizes an objector by revoking no less than twelve critical rights
and privileges available to all other Brazilian citizens. Although it may not be an offense
under the Brazilian Criminal Code, the exercise of conscientious objection results in severe
punishment otherwise reserved for criminal acts. See 1972 Report, supra note 13, at 41.
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The disqualification clause applies to the conscientious objector,
because military service is compulsory for all Brazilian citizens.217
The constitutional effect of the clause is the loss to the conscien-
tious objector of all political rights for a religiously motivated
refusal to perform military service."8 The conscientious objector
is not eligible to register to vote 19 or be elected to political office.'
As long as the suspension of political rights continues, the objec-
tor also is ineligible for any public or trade union office." Although
the Brazilian conscientious objector may not be imprisoned for the
refusal to bear arms, a fine may be imposed in the form of a military
tax under the Military Service Act.2" The penalities imposed upon
the conscientious objector do not end here. Within the Regulations
to the Military Service Act"3 there exists a disabling provision,
which applies to all citizens who are unable to produce proof of the
satisfaction of one's military obligation. ' Under that disabling pro-
vision, a Brazilian conscientious objector is prohibited from: (1) ob-
taining or renewing a passport; (2) becoming an employee in a
governmental organization, or one subsidized with government
funds; (3) signing a contract with the government (this applies to
all federal, state, territorial and municipal governments); (4) study-
217 CONST. Do BRASIL art. 92, which provides that: "All Brazilians are obligated to military
service or other duties necessary to the national security, under the terms and penalties
of the law."
"1' CONST. Do BRASIL art. 149, para. 1(b).
In both Sweden and Belgium, conscientious objectors receive benefits equal to those
granted servicemen. 1980 Report, supra note 28, Add. 1 at 11, Add. 3 at 2.
..9 CONST. Do BRASIL art. 147, para. 3(c).
CONST. DO BRASIL art. 150.
221 CONST. DO BRASIL art. 185, reprinted in 1980 Report, Add. 1, supra note 28, at 2 (The
1980 Report is cited here because there is a difference in translation between the text
of article 185 in the Organization of American States' version, supra note 213, and the
1980 Report's reference. The most recent translation is used here to account for any unknown
changes in interpretation or amendment.)
Ato de Servico Militar art. 69, Ley. no. 4,375 of Aug. 17, 1964, reprinted in 1980 Report,
Add. 1, supra note 28, at 3. "Military tax equivalent to the minimum fine shall be levied
on persons . . . who are granted a certificate of exemption from service." Id.
Regulamentos a Ato de Servico Militar, Decreto no. 57,654, of Jan. 20, 1966, reprinted
in 1980 Report, Add. 1, supra note 28, at 3-4.
' Id. at art. 210, reprinted in 1980 Report, Add. 1, supra note 28, at 4. Article 210 is
restricted to those citizens who remain eligible for induction, i.e., men between the ages
of 19 and 45.
Fulfillment of military obligations is defined under article 3(17) of the Regulations, and
it requires documentary proof attesting to one's military status. A conscientious objector
receives none of the nine valid documents. Nota bene; do not confuse the certificate of ex-
emption for moral disqualification (article 3(17)(c) of the Regulations), which applies to women
and clergymen under article 92 of the constitution, with the exemption allowed to con-
scientious objectors for reasons of religious, political or philosophical beliefs. The conscien-
tious objector receives no such certificate for the purposes of article 210 of the Regulations.
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ing in an educational institution; (5) obtaining work permits,
diplomas or occupational certification; (6) being appointed to a public
position; (7) holding any elected or appointed public office; and
(8) receiving any prize or privilege from any of the four categories
of governments.m It is difficult to imagine any deprivation of in-
dividual rights and privileges that would be more extensive than
these which act to deprive one of a livelihood.
The process of claiming conscientious objector status in Brazil
is relatively simple. The individual must submit a legal deposition
containing the grounds for objection. The deposition must indicate
that the objector is familiar with the legislation applicable to con-
scientious objection, and furthermore, that he is cognizant of the
consequences of his decision.' 2 Once an exemption is granted, there
is no subsequent provision for alternative service." However,
should an objector experience a change in conscience or religious
beliefs, his political rights may be restored only if he is drafted
into active military service. 8
B. Potential United Nations Treatment
Two questions remain to be addressed: What is the probability
that conscientious objection to military service will be recognized
in the near future as a fundamental human right under interna-
tional law, and what would be the operative effect of such action?
The mechanics of such a decision are relatively straight-forward.
The right of conscientious objection might be incorporated into
an international document, such as the Declaration of Human Rights
or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As a
compromise solution, an alternative would be to appoint a special
rapporteur, followed by the adoption of a resolution by the General
Assembly recognizing conscientious objection as a fundamental
human right. The operative effect of such action, on the other
hand, is more complicated than its mechanics.
One mode of analysis argues that the recognition of conscientious
Id. at art. 210(1-8), reprinted in 1980 Report, Add. 1, supra note 28, at 4.
1972 Report, supra note 3, at 41.
Id. In the Netherlands, not only is there provision for alternative service, but that
country allows several grounds for exemption from alternative service, e.g., being a bread-
winner. 1980 Report, Add. 2, supra note 28, at 3.
"' Regulamentos a Ato de Servico Militar, supra note 223, at art. 244, reprinted in 1980
Report, Add. 1, supra note 28, at 3-4.
' See 1981 Statement by International League for Human Rights, supra note 30. Either




objection would involve few if any administrative or constitutional
barriers. Countries that already have civilian directed development
programs could accommodate conscientious objectors readily.' Fur-
thermore, constitutional provisions mandating compulsory military
service for all citizens would not prevent the recognition of cons-
cientious objection, given the fact that women and children are
exempt already under such provisions.'"
Under the opposing point of view, it is argued that the question
of military service falls within the domestic jurisdiction of the
States.2 It also should be noted that the proposed inclusion of con-
scientious objection in article 18 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights was rejected flatly.2 3
Despite this difference of opinion, there may exist one solution
that would recognize the national sovereignty of a country, and
at the same time incorporate the right of conscientious objection
into an international human rights document. Article 8(3)(c)(ii) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides
that the guarantee of freedom from forced labor does not extend
to military service or to alternative service required of conscien-
tious objectors.'" That clause has been construed to mean that the
recognition of conscientious objection is a matter within the discre-
tion of a given country.2 5 However, the mention of conscientious
objection in article 8(3)(c)(ii) neither requires nor precludes its
recognition. Furthermore, it serves as the only reference to cons-
cientious objection in a major international human rights instru-
ment. This reference provides the source into which international
procedures applicable to the treatment of conscientious objectors
might be injected. Such a compromise solution still would be dif-
ficult to obtain, however. The step from the qualified recognition
of conscientious objection in the enforcement of apartheid, to a
general acknowledgement for all military service is probably too
Schaffer & Weissbrodt, supra note 1, at 41.
1 Id. at 47. These authors make a significant observation: the use of military per-
sonnel to decide the propriety of a claim should be eliminated, because the military has
a vested interest in the decision. Id. at 45.
1 The authority for such a position stems from the U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
n U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/353/Add. 3 at 7 (1950). The Republic of the Philippines recommended
in its Comment on the Draft International Covenant on Human Rights that, "[plersons who
conscientiously object to war as being contrary to their religion shall be exempt from military
service." That recommendation was never adopted. Id.
I, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 8(3XcXii), reprinted in THE
INTERNATIONAL BELL OF RIGHTS 381 (L. Henkin ed. 1981).
' Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and Erpression, Political Freedoms, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 234, at 212.
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great at this time. For the first time since the question of cons-
cientious objection was raised before the Commission on Human
Rights, a resolution has been adopted that ignores conscientious
objection, and no counterpart was presented to rebut such a
position.m It would be premature, however, to dismiss the possibil-
ity of the recognition of conscientious objection before the cur-
rent study is completed by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.
V. CONCLUSION
The privilege to object conscientiously to participation in military
service has been reaffirmed in the United States with the revi-
sion of the Selective Service deferment and exemption regulations.
The privilege to claim exemption is by no means absolute; the selec-
tive conscientious objector is denied the exemption regardless of
the sincerity or religious basis of his beliefs. While the revised
regulations attempt to improve the administrative efficiency of the
exemption process, it appears that this is accomplished at the ex-
pense of the conscientious objector. The validity of a claim is now
dependent upon the sufficiency of the information the conscien-
tious objector is able to provide.
The Selective Service presently is revising its alternative ser-
vice program, which establishes a system to coordinate resources
from governmental agencies. This system seeks to maximize the
placement of conscientious objectors according to their abilities
in areas of critical employment shortage.
From a comparative perspective, the question of conscientious
objection has been analyzed in this Note in the context of the West
German, Yugoslav and Brazilian provisions for the exemption.237
This approach has been utilized to establish a continuum along
which a specific nation's treatment of conscientious objection may
be placed. The most extensive recognition of conscientious objec-
tion exists in West Germany as a constitutional right, under which
' 1982 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 2) at 76, 154-55, U.N. Doc. E/1981/12; E/CN.4/1982/30
(1982). Resolution 1982/36 was adopted without a vote. Unfortunately, the summary records
of the 60th meeting on March 11, 1982, were not available at the time of publication to pro-
vide further explanation of the vote.
"' No attempt has been made in this Note to suggest a model legislative or constitu-
tional provision for conscientious objection to military service. Two organizations, the Legal
Committee of the Council of Europe and the International Peace Bureau in Geneva, have
attempted this task already. See Council of Europe Report, supra note 39; International
Peace Bureau, Draft Universal Charter of Conscientious Objection to Military Service or Train-
ing, reprinted in 3 J. JOYCE, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS 1684-87 (1978).
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the procedures for claiming the exemption are more liberal and
discretionary than those found in the United States. Also, the legal
rights of a West German objector are protected fully and provi-
sions are made for the completion of alternative civilian service.
Yugoslavia, on the other hand, lies at the other end of the con-
tinuum, as that nation compels military service of all its citizens
with absolutely no corresponding provision for conscientious ob-
jection. Rather than recognize conscientious objection as a privilege
or constitutional right, Yugoslavia has chosen to make it a criminal
offense. The Brazilian practice is the most deceptive of all, and
falls somewhere between Yugoslavia and the United States along
the continuum. Brazil recognizes the right to freedom of conscience,
but at the same time denies the conscientious objector several
significant political and individual rights. Brazil, like Yugoslavia,
makes no provision for alternative service.
Although the United States recognition of conscientious objec-
tion falls closest to the West German approach, many of the costs
borne by one claiming conscientious objector status in the United
States are not readily apparent. There are burdens that the cons-
cientious objector and his family will have to endure due to the
deprivation of benefits otherwise available to persons serving their
country. There are difficult choices to be made, as well, in the event
one's conscientious objection claim is not recognized. However,
these various difficulties with regard to conscientious objection
should not obscure a significant factor: the United States continues
to recognize that an individual's responsibility to his conscience
precludes a duty to military service.
The potential for the recognition of conscientious objection in
an international human rights instrument presently exists. It re-
mains to be seen whether the Commission on Human Rights will
realize that potential by the declaration of conscientious objection
as a fundamental human right.
Jonathan M. Engram
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